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Treasury Stock and the Courts
By L. L. Briggs

Many corporations throughout the country are taking advan
tage of a depressed stock market to purchase their own shares,
thereby creating treasury stock. The attitude of the courts
toward such stock is the subject of this article.
Most courts consider treasury stock to be corporate shares
which have been issued and outstanding but later have been
acquired by the issuing company through purchase, donation or
in some other manner. While this conception applies to business
corporations in general it apparently does not apply to mining
companies. In State v. Manhattan Verde Company (1910) 32 Nev.
474, the court said that treasury stock of such companies is:
. . such stock as is set aside for the actual development of the
property.” Obviously, mining corporations may set aside un
issued stock for developmental purposes and these shares may be
classed as treasury stock.
In the absence of express authorization the English courts deny
the right of a limited company on common-law principles to
purchase its own stock. It is universally admitted in that coun
try that a corporation has no authority to make a business of
trafficking in its own shares (Ashbury Railway Carriage and Iron
Company v. Riche (1875) L. R. 7 H. L. 653).
Let us trace the development of the English rule. In Teasdale's
case (1873) L. R. 9 Ch. App. 54, Lord Justice James said by way
of dictum:
“There is no doubt that a company may give itself power to purchase its own
shares, to take surrender of shares and to cancel certificates of shares.”

At a later date, the same court changed its mind. In Hope v.
International Financial Society (1877) 4 Ch. D. 326, it said:
" I am reported to have said in Teasdale's case that the power to purchase
shares would be good. I am not quite sure whether that was not too wide a
deduction from the cases to which I was then referring, and certainly it was not
necessary for the decision of the case.”

However, Lord Justice James states that a corporation may ac
cept the surrender of its shares from a shareholder who can not
pay and may release him from further liability.
171

The Journal of Accountancy

In Guinness v. Land Corporation of Ireland (1882) 22 Ch. D.
349, Lord Justice Cotton, after referring to section 380 of the
companies act, said:
“From that it follows that whatever has been paid by a member can not be
returned to him. In my opinion, it also follows that what is described in the
memorandum as the capital can not be diverted from the objects of the society.
It is, of course, liable to be spent or lost in carrying on the business of the com
pany, but no part of it can be returned to a member so as to take away from the
fund to which the creditors have a right to look as that out of which they are
to be paid.”

The leading English decision on the right of a company to buy
back its own stock is Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) L. R. 12 A. C.
409. This decision involves a flannel manufacturing corporation
with two sections of its articles of association giving the company
power to purchase any of its outstanding shares and to sell, dis
pose of them or to extinguish them. The question before the
house of lords was whether a company could lawfully purchase its
own shares by any method other than that which the statute pro
vided with respect to the reduction of capital. Lord Herschell
said:
“What was the reason which induced the company in the present case to
purchase its shares? If it was that they might sell them again, this would be a
trafficking in the shares, and clearly unauthorized. If it was to retain them,
this would be to my mind as indirect method of reducing the capital of the
company.”

Since both trafficking in shares and the reduction of capital in
any manner other than that prescribed by parliament are illegal,
the house of lords decided that the purchase was illegal because
the act was in excess of corporate capacity and was inconsistent
with the nature of corporate organization. Parliament has given
this decision statutory approval in the companies act of 1929.
In Bellerby v. Rowland (1902) 2 Ch. 14, the directors surrendered
their shares to the corporation to make good a loss for which they
were not liable. These shares were not paid in full. Thereafter
the company prospered and the directors sued for the return of
their shares and they were able to recover them. The transfer
was held to be ineffective because it released the directors from
liability on calls. Collins, master of the rolls, said that there is:
"... no distinction in principle between returning to shareholder a part of
the paid-up capital in exchange for his shares and wiping out his liability for the
uncalled-up sum payable thereon. Both methods involve a reduction of the
capital ...”
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According to the English view, if a company give a shareholder
anything in return for his stock, the corporation’s capital, in
the sense of assets, is reduced. The nature of the corporate
idea prohibits this method of getting rid of corporate property.
Consequently, a company must follow the statutory procedure
for reduction of capital stock in order to purchase its own
shares.
England, however, permits unlimited companies to buy back
their own shares. In In re Borough Commercial and Building
Society (1893) 2 Ch. 242, the court held that the rule of Trevor v.
Whitworth does not apply to such companies and made this
statement:
“ By the very force of the terms, it is plain that in the case of an unlimited
company the creditors know that there is no fixed capital, and, therefore they
have no right to complain, if I may use that term, of a reduction of that which
has never been fixed in any way. There is nothing in the companies acts pro
hibiting such purchases.”

England allows certain exceptions to the rule of Trevor v Whit
worth. In case of consolidation or reorganization of companies,
dissenting shareholders have the right to an appraisal and the
payment of the value of their shares by their company. How
ever, a dissenter is still liable to creditors of the company after he
has received payment for his shares (Part's Case (1870) L. R. 10
Eq. 622) unless the creditors have agreed to look solely to the
transferee company for the satisfaction of their claims (Taurine
Company, Anning and Cobb's Case (1878) 38 L. T. R. 53). Eng
land permits a company to forfeit its shares for non-payment of
calls and to receive shares as a voluntary gift or bequest (In re
Denver Hotel Company (1893) 1 Ch. 495; Kirby v. Wilkins (1930)
142 L. T. R. 16).
Canada follows the English rule. In Alberta Rolling Mills
Company v. Christie (1919) 58 Can. Sup. Ct. 208, Christie refused
to purchase stock of the defendant corporation unless his property
would be increased in value by the erection of a steel plant in his
town, so the company agreed to take back his stock and refund
the amount of his subscription if the plant was not built in that
location. The company refused to erect the plant or to rescind
the stock purchase, whereupon Christie brought suit to recover
the amount paid for the stock. Justice Anglin dismissed the suit
on the ground that there is no power in a corporation to acquire
its own stock.
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The courts in various jurisdictions of the United States do not
agree as to the right of a corporation to purchase its own shares of
stock. According to Justice McIlvaine in Coppin v. Greenless and
Ransom Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275:
“ The power of a trading company to traffic in its own stock, where no author
ity to do so is conferred upon it by the terms of its charter, has been a subject
of much discussion in the courts; and the conclusions reached by the different
courts have been conflicting.”

A few courts have followed the English rule, with some qualifi
cations, as being more conservative than the majority rule (Mary
land Trust Company v. National Mechanics' Bank (1906) 102 Md.
608; Morgan v. Lewis (1888) 46 Oh. St. 1). In Morgan v. Lewis,
Chief Justice Owen held that a corporation may not traffic in its
own shares and said:
“We have no disposition to call in question the general and well recognized
principle that a corporation cannot buy its own stock.”

According to Justice McIlvaine, in Coppin v. Greenless and Ran
som Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275:
. “. . . the right of a corporation to traffic in its own stock, at pleasure, ap
pears to us to be inconsistent with the principle of the provisions of the present
constitution ...”

Two eminent authorities on corporation law, Morawetz (1 Cor
porations (2d edition, 1886) 109) and Machen (Corporations, sec.
626) support the minority doctrine.
Let us review the arguments against the right of a corporation
to buy back its own shares. It has been held that a corporation
is a legal personality of limited powers and is capable of perform
ing only such acts as are expressly authorized by the state {Cart
wright v. Dickinson (1889) 88 Tenn. 476). In Coppin v. Greenless
and Ransom Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275, Justice McIlvaine, in
discussing the power of a corporation to acquire treasury stock by
purchase, made the following statement:
“ But, nevertheless, we think the decided weight of authority both in England
and in the United States is against the existence of the power, unless conferred
by express grant or clear implication. The foundation principle, upon which
these latter cases rest, is that a corporation possesses no powers except such as
are conferred upon it by its charter, either by express grant or necessity impli
cation ; and this principle has been frequently declared by the supreme court of
this state; and by no court more emphatically than by this court.”

It was decided by the court in Hunter v. Garanflo (1912) 246
Mo. 131, that if the statutes or charter give no definite grant of
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power to a corporation to buy its own shares such a purchase is
invalid. In State v. A. & N. R. R. (1888) 24 Neb. 144, the court
held that the enumeration of powers which a corporation may
exercise implies the exclusion of all others, so a purchase of treas
ury stock would be invalid unless specifically authorized.
The purchase of its own shares by a corporation has been held
to be in excess of corporate capacity because such a transaction
does not fall in line with the nature of corporate organization.
In Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) L. R. 12 A. C. 409, Lord Herschell
said:
“ It appears to me that ... it is inconsistent with the essential nature of a
company that it should become a member of itself.”

Some have argued that the power to acquire treasury stock
by purchase is not necessary to carry on the corporate business in
a satisfactory manner (27 Harvard Law Review 747). Justice
McIlvaine, in Coppin v. Greenless and Ransom Company (1882)
38 Oh. St. 275, said:
“ But where the sole object of the corporation is, as in this case, ‘ for manufac
turing purposes,’ it can not be said in any just sense that the power to acquire,
invest in or convey its own stock was either necessary or convenient for
'manufacturing purposes.’ ”

No state would permit a corporation to be organized for the
sole purpose of trading in its own shares because corporations are
allowed only for socially useful purposes. A corporation has no
authority to make its business that of buying and selling its own
shares. It has been held that the purchase by a corporation of
its shares is a breach of a fundamental agreement among the share
holders themselves and also with the state. The shareholders
who sell their stock to the corporation leave their liability to be
borne by the remaining shareholders.
Many courts have held that corporations should be prohibited
from buying their own stock because such purchases reduce the
funds available to creditors and thereby impair their security
(Whaley v. King (1918) 141 Tenn. 1; Kom v. Cody Detective
Agency (1913) 76 Wash. 541). Persons who deal with a corpora
tion rely upon the amount of its capital stock and have a right to
assume that this asset will remain undiminished. If a corpora
tion pays for its own shares out of capital, it undoubtedly reduces
the amount available for the satisfaction of creditors’ claims
(Crandall v. Lincoln (1884) 52 Conn. 73). Furthermore, the
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rights of creditors are injured if the purchase is from surplus,
because the number of persons to whom creditors may resort is
reduced. Treasury stock of an insolvent corporation is utterly
worthless to creditors (In re Tichenor-Grand Company (1913)
203 Fed. 720).
In discussing this subject in Coppin v. Greenless and Ransom
Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275, Justice McIlvaine said:
“ If the right of a corporation to purchase its own stock at pleasure exists and
is unlimited, where is the provision intended for the benefit of creditors? . . .
They have a right, however, to assume that stock once issued, and not called
back in the manner provided by law, remains outstanding in the hands of stock
holders liable to respond to creditors to the extent of the individual liability
prescribed.”

The following statement was made by the court in Savings
Bank v. Wulfekuhler (1877) 19 Kan. 60:
"For a bank to use its funds in the purchase of stock . . . might also impair
or even destroy all security given by law to creditors of the bank. The law
provides in effect that not only the bank with all its property shall be liable
for its debts, but also that each stockholder in the bank to the amount of his
stock shall also be liable. But if a bank may purchase all its stock, and own
itself, then where would be the security to the creditors?

The power of the directors of a corporation to purchase its stock
gives them the power to give preference to favored stockholders
by allowing them to withdraw their contribution to a venture in
which they have lost confidence (Crandall v. Lincoln (1884) 52
Conn. 73). They may permit the favored stockholders to with
draw at an advantageous price (Grasselli Chemical Company v.
Aetna Explosives Company (1918) 258 Fed. 66). According to
Justice McSherry, in Maryland Trust Company v. Mechanics'
Bank (1906) 102 Md. 608:
"The enforcement of the contract of purchase would result in security to
the shareholders whose stock the corporation purchased at a higher price for
their shares than could be realized by the remaining stockholders from the
assets of the concern . . . and thus the capital of the concern might be di
verted from its legitimate channels and be used for the benefit of recalcitrant
or cantankerous members to the detriment of confiding shareholders.”

In the case of banks with double liability, the stockholders
whose shares are bought by the bank escape and leave the re
maining shareholders with the entire burden of satisfying creditors.
If directors offered to purchase from all stockholders in propor
tion to their holdings, the action would not be so objectionable,
but such offers are rarely made. In Shoemaker v. Washburn
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Lumber Company (1897) 97 Wis. 585, it was held that the rule
requiring ratable treatment of shareholders in case of reduction of
capital does not apply when a corporation purchases its own
stock. It is interesting to note in passing that in Berger v.
United States Steel (1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 809, the court decided that
companies desiring to purchase their own stock must offer to buy
from all equally. So far as I have been able to determine, this
rule is not enforced in any jurisdiction, not even New Jersey itself,
for section 29 of the compiled statutes of that state authorizes a
non-ratable purchase. Where purchases are non-ratable the
relative status of the remaining stockholders is disturbed.
It is possible that directors may purchase their corporation’s
shares in such a way as to keep themselves in power and to get
rid of certain stockholders. In Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) L. R.
12 A. C. 409, Lord MacNaghten asked:
“ Who are the stockholders whose continuance in a company its executives
consider undesirable? Why, the shareholders who quarrel with the policy of
the board, and wish to turn the directors out; the shareholders who ask ques
tions which it may not be convenient to answer; shareholders who want in
formation which the directors think it prudent to withhold. Can it be con
tended that when the policy of directors is assailed, they may expend the capital
of the company in keeping themselves in power or in purchasing the retirement
of inquisitive and troublesome critics?”

The house of lords decided that corporate directors can not buy
shares for this purpose. In the same decision, Lord Herschell
said:
“I can quite understand that the directors of a company may sometimes
desire that the shareholders should not be numerous, and that they should be
persons likely to leave them with a free hand to carry on their operations. But
I think it would be most dangerous to countenance the view that, for reasons
such as these, they could legitimately expend the moneys of the company to
any extent they please in the purchase of its shares. No doubt, if certain share
holders are disposed to hamper the proceedings of the company, and are willing
to sell their shares, they may be bought out; but this must be done by persons,
existing shareholders or others, who can be induced to purchase the shares,
and not out of the funds of the company.”

The purchase of treasury stock with corporation funds in part
contributed by a minority opposing the transaction may enable
a rival majority to get a stranglehold on the affairs of the corpora
tion, because the amount of votable stock is at least temporarily
decreased and the influence of the majority is made correspond
ingly greater. In some jurisdictions it is possible for the directors
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to convert a minority interest into a majority interest by the
purchase of the corporation’s shares (Elliot v. Baker (1907) 194
Mass. 518; Luther v. Luther (1903) 118 Wis. 112).
When a corporation buys its own shares, the enterprise in
which the stockholders originally invested is not the same.
Justice Timlin, in his dissenting opinion in Gilchrist v. Highfield
(1909) 140 Wis. 476, made the following statement:
“ The purchase by a corporation of its own stock not only changes the frac
tional interest of a dissenting stockholder against his will but it changes the
character of the property in which he has an interest, . . . The stockholder
may have depended upon a certain amount of capital which has been reduced.”

The readjustment of voting strength attendant upon the pur
chase of treasury stock usually injures the small non-assenting
stockholder. However, if no other purpose than the gain of
control motivated a purchase, the courts might intervene at the
request of objecting stockholders in some jurisdictions. In
O'Connor v. International Silver Company (1904) 68 N. J. Eq. 67,
Vice-Chancellor Pitney said:
“. . . the scheme of corporate management is that of a representative gov
ernment, in which the representatives are bound to be governed by and repre
sent only the interests of those they represent. Hence any device or practice
which in any wise or to any degree diminishes or prevents the exercise of the
right of each of the active owners to have a voice in the election of directors
precisely in the proportion to the amount of his interest is vicious and in posi
tive contravention of the fundamental principle upon which corporations are
built up.”

Some courts have held that a purchase of its own stock by a
corporation may be considered a reduction of capital for a time at
least (Burke v. Smith (1929) 111 Md. 624; Morgan v. Lewis (1888)
46 Oh. St. 1). Although the shares are not retired and are carried
on the books as treasury stock, the stock is not outstanding and the
effect is the same as that of reduction because the directors can
keep the stock in the treasury for an indefinite period. The courts
that have adopted this view have refused to imply any power
in corporations to make such purchases {Abeles v. Cochran
(1879) 22 Kan. 405; Crandall v. Lincoln (1884) 52 Conn.
73). Chief Justice McSherry made this statement in Mary
land Trust Company v. National Mechanics' Bank (1906) 102
Md. 608:
”... a corporation . . . diminishes its capital to the extent of the shares
purchased, ...”
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According to Lord Herschel! in Trevor v. Whitworth (1887)
L. R. 12 A. C. 409:
“And the strongest precautions to prevent the reduction of the capital of a
limited company, without due notice and judicial sanction, would be idle if the
company might purchase its own shares wholesale and so effect the desired
result.”

Morawetz (Private Corporations (2d edition, 1886) 113) says that:
“ No verbiage can disguise the fact that a purchase by a company of shares in
itself really amounts to a reduction of the company’s assets.”

Machen (Modern Law of Corporations, 514) states that a pur
chase by a corporation of its own stock is “a subtle method of
evading the rule against unauthorized reduction of capital.”
In Meisenheimer v. Alexander (1913) 162 N. C. 226, the court
held that as between a stockholder and the corporation, a mere
vote to release subscriptions and cancel shares reduced the capital
in the sense that the shares no longer existed for any purpose,
although there had been no attempt to carry out the statutory
formalities for the reduction of capital stock.
The general corporation statutes of all jurisdictions provide a
formal method for the reduction of capital stock. In most states
it is no doubt contrary to legislative intent that a corporation
shall effect an unannounced reduction of its announced capital
stock by a purchase of its own shares and thus evade the statutes.
In Delaware and Florida one of the statutory methods of reducing
capital stock is through purchase of shares. Massachusetts,
New York and Colorado require a charter amendment for the re
duction of capital stock; Louisiana and North Dakota require
the sanction of the stockholders; while practically every state and
territory insists upon the filing of a certificate and the approval of
some state officer. Yet all these states allow a corporation to buy
its own stock and keep it in the treasury for an indefinite length
of time. One of the latest statements of the prevailing rule is
found in Thompson on Corporations (supplement, 1931) sec. 3685:
“ It is not illegal for a corporation to retire its stock if it has sufficient surplus
so that the rights of creditors will not be adversely affected.”

If a corporation has no debts, it may purchase all of its own
stock in some states. In Brown v. Fire Insurance Company of
Chicago (1932) 265 Ill. App. 393, it was held that in the absence
of unfair dealing or fraud of some kind, there is no reason why a
corporation can not purchase all of its own stock and retire from
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business and by this method distribute its assets to its stock
holders. It would be impossible for a corporation to pay more
than book value for all of its stock and, if it paid book value, there
would be no difficulty because there would be nothing left of the
corporate assets after the purchase. It is possible, however, for a
corporation to buy back all of its stock for less than book value.
In that case some assets would remain after all the stock had been
purchased. Would the corporation vanish into nothing and leave
these assets without an owner?
Advocates of the minority doctrine argue that a purchase of a
corporation’s own stock from surplus is unjust because at the
time of subscription the subscribers did not anticipate diversion
of profits to permit a few members to retire their capital con
tributions and thereby delay the payment of dividends to the
others. If the purchase price is above the book value the share
of the remaining stockholders in the surplus is lessened, while if
the purchase price is below book value the interest of the rest of
the stockholders in the surplus is increased. Sale of the stock
to the corporation at book value does not affect the equity of the
remaining stockholders. No matter what price is paid for the
stock, surplus assets (in the payment) are paid out and conse
quently are not available for dividends to the stockholders who
have retained their shares in the company.
In the minority view a purchase by a corporation of its own
stock is a nullity and may be set aside by an interested party.
This may be done by the vendor (Darnell-Love Lumber Company
v. Wiggs (1921) 141 Tenn. 113) or by a trustee of the corporation
(Whaley v. King (1918) 141 Tenn. 1). The contract is so illegal
that in Maryland Trust Company v. National Mechanics' Bank
(1906) 102 Md. 608, the court held that a bank was not able to
collect from the corporation a loan made to it for the purpose of
such a purchase.
In Currier v. Lebanon Slate Company (1875) 56 N. H. 262, the
court decided that a non-assenting stockholder may enjoin a pro
posed purchase of its own shares by a corporation.
The advocates of the minority doctrine do not go so far as to
say that there is a set rule that a corporation may not acquire its
own stock. According to Chief Justice Owen, in Morgan v.
Lewis (1888) 46 Oh. St. 1:
“. . . no inflexible rule has been recognized by this court, that a corporation
may not in any case, nor for any purpose, receive its own stock. On the con
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trary, the way is left open for the application of exceptions to the general rule
in proper cases.”

Without express power given in its charter a corporation may
take its stock incidentally in the ordinary course of business.
Even though purchase is prohibited, many courts concede the
right of a corporation to forfeit shares (Mitchell v. Blue Star
Mining Company (1917) 98 Wash. 191; Lemoore Canal and Irriga
tion Company v. McKenna (1912) 163 Cal. 736), because a com
pany must have the power to recover stock when subscribers do
not pay calls or assessments in order to protect itself from loss
(Draper v. Blackwell (1903) 138 Ala. 182). In Trevor v. Whit
worth (1887) L. R. 12 A. C. 409, Lord MacNaghten said:
“There can be no question as to the power of a company in a proper case to
forfeit shares.”

Since forfeiture involves no outlay on the part of the corpora
tion it would seem that there could be no objection to it. Lord
Herschell, in Trevor v. Whitworth, says:
“The forfeiture of shares . . . does not involve any payment by the com
pany, and it presumably exonerates from future liability those who have shown
themselves unable to contribute what is due from them to the capital of the
company.”

A similar statement was made by Lord Watson in the same
decision.
If a stockholder voluntarily surrenders his shares where other
wise forfeiture would be resorted to, the corporation may accept
them {Alling v. Wenzel (1890) 133 Ill. 264). Such a creation of
treasury stock is a harmless transaction {State v. Oberlin Building
Association (1879) 35 Oh. St. 458; Crandall v. Lincoln (1884) 52
Conn. 73). However, the surrender of shares calling for any
monetary outlay is as objectionable as a purchase. According to
Lord Herschell in Trevor v. Whitworth (1887) L. R. 12 A. C. 409:
“Surrender . . . does not involve any payment out of the funds of the
company. If the surrender were made in consideration of any such payment
it would be neither more or less than a sale and open to the same objections.
If it were accepted in a case when the company were in position to forfeit the
shares, the transaction would seem to me perfectly valid.”

In the same decision Lord MacNaghten said:
“Surrender of shares stands on a different footing. It is not mentioned in
the companies acts, but I conceive that there can be no objection to the sur
render of shares which are liable to forfeiture. A surrender of shares in return
for money paid by the company is a sale and open to the same objections as a
sale, whatever expression may be used to describe or disguise the transaction.”
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In Hall v. Alabama Terminal (1911) 173 Ala. 398, the court held
that it was a fraud on creditors for a corporation to purchase its
shares in an attempt to discharge the liability of an original sub
scriber for an unpaid subscription by the use of corporate assets.
It has been decided in numerous cases that the cancellation of an
enforcible claim against a subscriber was parting with valuable
corporate assets (Sawyer v. Hoag (1873) 17 Wall. (U. S.) 610;
Payne v. Brillard (1851) 23 Miss. 88; Harmon v. Hunt (1895) 116
N. C. 678; Nichols v. Stevens (1894) 123 Mo. 96). According to 1
Cook on Corporations (8th edition, 1923) sec. 168:
“The well-established rule, however, is that the corporate directors have no
power to agree with a subscriber that his subscription shall be cancelled, unless
such power is given by charter or statute or the by-laws of the corporation.
The cancellation of a subscription differs little from a purchase by the corpora
tion of its own stock.”

There is at least one contrary decision. In Shoemaker v.
Washburn Lumber Company (1897) 97 Wis. 585, the court held
that a release of unpaid subscriptions was valid against subse
quent creditors. In his dissenting opinion in Grace Securities
Corporation v. Roberts (1932) 164 S. E. 700, Justice Epes stated:
“. . . that where there is reasonable ground for belief that the subscriber is
unable to meet his obligation to pay for the stock for which he has subscribed,
courts will often uphold, as against non-assenting stockholders, and sometimes
against creditors, the cancellation of a stock subscription.”

A corporation may acquire its own stock as security for an
antecedent debt (Draper v. Blackwell (1903) 138 Ala. 182; German
Savings Bank v. Wulfekuhler (1879) 19 Kan. 60). It may accept
its stock as collateral for a debt and by enforcing its lien create
treasury stock (City Bank v. Bruce (1858) 17 N. Y. 507; Williams
v. Savage Manufacturing Company (1851) 3 Md. Ch. 452). In
State v. Oberlin Building Association (1879) 35 Oh. St. 263, the
court said :
“We do not deny that a corporation has power to receive shares of its stock
as security for a debt or other similar purpose.”

However, the debt must not be otherwise collectible (Fitzpatrick
v. McGregor (1909) 133 Ga. 332).
A corporation may take its own stock in compromise of a dis
puted claim or a hopeless debt (Taylor v. Miami Exporting Com
pany (1833) 6 Oh. 176; State v. Oberlin Building Association
(1879) 35 Oh. St. 258). This is especially true when the debtor is
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insolvent (Bank v. Overman Carr Company (1899) 17 Oh. C. C.
353). In Morgan v. Lewis (1888) 46 Oh. 1, Chief Justice Owen
said:
"... the right of a corporation to take its own stock in satisfaction of a debt
due to it, has long been recognized in this state.”

According to Justice McIlvaine in Coppin v. Greenless and
Ransom Company (1882) 38 Oh. St. 275;
“ It is true, however, that in most jurisdictions, where the right of a corpora
tion to traffic in its own stock has been denied, an exception to the rule has been
admitted to exist, whereby a corporation has been allowed to take its own stock
in satisfaction of a debt due to it. This exception is supposed to rest on a ne
cessity which arises in order to avoid loss; ...”

In one of the latest treasury-stock decisions, Grace Securities
Corporation v. Roberts (1932) 164 S. E. 700, Justice Epes, in a dis
senting opinion, made this statement:
"... where the purchase of stock is made in good faith to save the corpora
tion a loss upon a debt due it, the courts generally will uphold the transaction.”

A corporation may acquire its own stock in order to compromise
internal dissension involving its stockholders (Cole v. Cole Realty
Company (1912) 169 Mich. 347; Morgan v. Lewis (1888) 46 Oh.
St. 6). Furthermore, it may get rid of opposition to legitimate
corporate action by buying opposing shares (Stott v. Orloff (1933)
261 Mich. 302).
A corporation may receive its shares by gift (Lake Superior
Iron Company v. Drexel (1882) 90 N. Y. 87) or bequest (Rivanna
Navigation Company v. Dawson (1846) 3 Gratt. (Va). 19; Sherman
v. Shaughnessy (1910) 148 Mo. App. 679). It has been held that
the power of a corporation to accept a bequest of outstanding
shares could be questioned only by quo warranto. (See Fayette
Land Company v. Louisville and Nashville R. R. (1896) 93 Va.
274).
When stockholders are subject to double liability or the shares
are only partly paid up, a gift destroys the security of the creditors
(Bellerby v. Rowland (1902) 2 Ch. 14). In Barth v. Pock (1916)
155 P. 282, many of the shareholders of a state bank donated a
third of their stock to the bank for it to sell for the purpose of
building up a surplus. While the stock was still unsold the bank
failed and a creditor sought to enforce the statutory double
liability on the unsold shares against the donors. The court held
that the donors were liable. In Crease v. Babcock (1842) 10 Metc
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(Mass.) 525, the court decided that where a statutory liability
was imposed upon stockholders that this liability was not in
creased by the presence of some of the stock in the hands of the
corporation.
In Condouris v. Imperial Tobacco Company (1893) 22 N. Y.
Supp. 695, the court held that there could be no objection to
treasury stock created by operation of law.
When a corporation has issued and sold more stock than it is
authorized to issue, it may repurchase enough of its shares to cor
rect the wrong it has done (Kelly v. Central Union Fire Insurance
Company, 101 Kan. 91).
Under the minority doctrine a purchase of its own shares by a
corporation is ultra vires (4 Thompson on Corporations, 2d edi
tion, secs. 4075, 4076; Maryland Trust Company v. National
Mechanics' Bank (1906) 102 Md. 608; Wilson v. Torchon, 149
S. W. 1156) but the transaction is not so objectionable as to justify
quo warranto against the corporation (State v. Minnesota Thresher
Manufacturing Company (1889) 40 Minn. 213).
The majority rule in the United States is that a corporation
may acquire its own stock for legitimate corporate purposes if the
rights of creditors are not involved (Wolfe v. Excelsior (1921) 270
Pa. 547; Federal Mortgage Company v. Simes (1932) 245 N. W.
169; Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Company (1932) 163 A. 140;
Brown v. Fire Insurance Company of Chicago (1932) 265 Ill. App.
393).
Let us see what the courts have said about this rule. In
Fremont Carriage Manufacturing Company v. Thomsen (1902)
65 Neb. 370, this statement appears:
“The overwhelming weight of authority is that, unless prohibited by the
statute or its own charter, a corporation may purchase its own shares of stock,
to a reasonable amount, and for a legitimate purpose.”

According to the court in United States Mining Company v.
Camden, 106 Va. 663:
“ In the absence of charter or statutory prohibition, it is well settled, indeed
the prevailing doctrine in the United States, that corporations may purchase,
hold and sell shares of their own stock provided they act in good faith and
without intent to injure their creditors.”

In Atlanta v. Smith (1909) 141 Wis. 377, Justice Marshall said:
“ By a long line of decisions here, in the absence of a plain statutory provision
to the contrary, and we have none, or such provision in the articles of organiza
tion of the corporation, a corporation may, in general, so long as it acts in good
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faith by authorization of its governing body, lawfully purchase its own stock,
either as to stockholders or present or future creditors, and without such
authorization its officers may, acting in good faith, do so as regards consenting
stockholders or such creditors.”

A per-curiam opinion in Chicago v. Marseilles (1876) 84 Ill. 643
contains this statement:
"These authorities, we think, fully recognize the power of the directors of a
company, when not prohibited by their charter, to purchase shares of stock of
their company. It falls within the scope of the power of the directors to man
age and control the affairs and property of the company for the best interests
of the stockholders, and when they have thus acted, we will presume, until the
contrary is shown, that the purchase was for legitimate and authorized pur
poses."

Judge Nelson gave this dictum in Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing
Company (1895) 70 Fed. 646:
"In the absence of a charter provision or statute forbidding it, there is no
reason why the stock should not be purchased, at least with the profits derived
from the business of the corporation, where all the stockholders assent thereto.”

A more precise statement of the rule is given by Justice Epes
in his dissenting opinion in Grace Securities Corporation v. Roberts
(1932) 164 S. E. 700:
" In the absence of statutory or charter authority or inhibition, a contract by
a corporation to purchase its own stock will be upheld or enforced against the
corporation, provided (1) that it is made in good faith without intent to injure
creditors or stockholders who have not expressly or impliedly given their assent
to or ratified the making of the contract; and provided (2) that at the time of
performance compliance with contract did not, or its enforcement will not, in
fact, injure creditors or nonassenting stockholders.”

Since corporations may obtain their own shares in so many
other ways it would seem that there is nothing inherent in their
nature to forbid the power of purchase.
The power to purchase its own stock may be incidental and
necessary to accomplish the object for which the corporation was
created. In Dupee v. Boston Water Power Company (1873) 114
Mass. 37, the court held that a corporation chartered to purchase
and operate water-power plants could lawfully sell its sites and
receive its own stock in payment when its water-power privileges
were no longer profitable.
It has been held that a grant to acquire property generally for
corporate purposes gives an implied power to the corporation to
acquire its own stock (Iowa Lumber Company v. Foster (1878) 49
Iowa 26; Chapman v. Iron Clad Rheostat Company (1898) 62
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N. J. L. 497). Statutes and charters may directly authorize a
corporation to purchase real and personal property. There are
many decisions to the effect that a corporation’s own shares are
personal property.
Let us trace the development of the majority doctrine. So far
as I have been able to determine, the first decision involving the
purchase by a corporation of its own stock is Hartridge v. Rockwell
(1828) R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260. In this decision it was held that
a bank could invest its idle capital in its own stock which it could
thereafter sell. Although the court was aware that creditors
might be concerned with the transaction, it was thought that the
substitution of the stock for the money in the treasury protected
them. Judge Davies said:
“ If from the course of the business, or the state of things, the capital of the
bank can not be usefully employed in loans, there can, I think, be no objection
against the purchase of its own stock. In such purchase a part of the capital
is withdrawn, but is represented by the stock purchased; ...”

The next case seems to be Taylor v. Miami Exporting Company
(1833) 6 Ohio 177. In this decision the court said:
“ It appears from the testimony in the case, that they (the directors) were at
one time largely and profitably employed in buying and selling the stock of the
Bank of the United States. If they could so invest their funds, why have they
not power to buy and sell their own stock, if they ‘think it most advantageous
to the company? ’ We think they have such power; and having it, they may
fix the price, the mode of purchase and of payment.”

City Bank v. Bruce (1858) 17 N. Y. 507 is the basis for the New
York rule permitting purchase. Although the corporation ac
cepted its shares in payment of an antecedent debt, the language
of the decision favors granting the power generally. The supreme
court of the United States in Commissioners of Johnson County
v. Thayer (1896) 94 U. S. 631, cited this decision for the broad
proposition that a corporation may purchase its own shares even
though no debt is involved. In Burnes v. Burnes (1905) 137 Fed.
781, the court states as settled law that:
"... in the absence of constitutional or statutory prohibition, corporations
have inherent power to buy, to sell and retire their own stock.”

Justice Marshall, in Atlanta v. Smith (1909) 141 Wis. 377, said:
”... by a long line of decisions here ... a corporation . . . may, in
general, so long as it acts in good faith . . . purchase its own stock ...”

Many courts have held that a purchase of its own shares by a
corporation does not effect a reduction of its capital stock. In
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Dupee v. Boston Water Power Company (1873) 114 Mass. 37,
after stating that a corporation could buy and sell its own stock,
the court said :
“There is nothing in the vote of the corporation, or in the action of the direc
tors, which amounts to a reduction of capital, ...”

In Leonard v. Draper (1905) 187 Mass. 536, it was held that a pur
chase by a corporation of its own stock was not a reduction of
capital stock, because the shares were kept ready for reissue. In
Borg v. International Silver Company (1925) 11 Fed. (2d) 149, a
stockholder sued to enjoin his company from selling at auction
some of its own stock obtained through dissolution of a subsidiary.
The corporation had been organized under the laws of New Jersey
which had provisions for stock reduction, but there had been no
attempt to comply with them. The bill was dismissed and the
decree affirmed on appeal, on the ground that the capital stock
had not been reduced by the purchase of these shares. Judge
Hand said:
“We do not see how it can be thought that the shares in question were in fact
retired. The New Jersey statutes (section 27, N. J. Corporation Law (P. L.
1896, p. 277)) prescribed a method by which this could be done, and there was
no pretense of following it . . .”

The following statement is found in 1 Cook on Corporations
(7th edition, 1913) 811:
“. . . a mere transfer of stock to the corporation, whether the corporation
assumes to buy the stock or the stockholders simply surrender it, will in no case
constitute a reduction, when no formal reduction of the capital stock is made.”

Treasury stock remains in existence while in possession of the
corporation (2 Cook on Corporations (8th edition, 1923) sec. 313).
At least one contrary decision is found in the court reports. In
Allen v. Francisco Sugar Company (1912) 193 Fed. 825, it was de
cided that a corporation has:
“. . . an inherent right, for a bona-fide purpose, to retire by purchase its
capital stock.”

Morawetz (1 Private Corporations (2d edition, 1886) sec. 112)
favors the contrary view.
When a corporation buys back its own stock it is not necessarily
trading in shares, for such a purchase may not be for the purpose
of profit but may be a necessary measure for carrying on the cor
porate business (American Railway Frog Company v. Haven (1869)
101 Mass. 398; Williams v. Savage Manufacturing Company (1851)
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3 Md. Ch. 418). Trading means first a purchase and then a sale.
If no sale is intended or made a mere purchase of stock can not be
termed trading.
Courts following the majority doctrine insist that a corporation
purchasing its own shares may do so only from surplus available
for dividends (Hall v. Henderson (1899) 126 Ala. 449; Grasselli
Chemical Company v. Aetna Explosives Company (1918) 258 Fed.
66; Western and Southern Fire Insurance Company v. Murphy
(1916) 56 Okla. 702). Such a purchase, if made in good faith, is
valid even as against creditors (Tierney v. Butler (1909) 144 Iowa
553; Wolf v. Excelsior (1921) 270 Pa. 547. In Cross v. Beguelin
(1929) 252 N. Y. 262, the court of appeals said:
“When made, the agreement . . . was valid. The surplus existed. After
the corporation became financially embarrassed and the surplus shrank to a
deficit, the agreement became unenforceable against the corporation.”

A similar ruling was made in Richards v. Wiener (1912) 207 N. Y.
59 and McIntyre v. Bements' Sons Company (1906) 146 Mich. 74.
In Williams v. McLave (1915) 154 N. Y. Supp. 38, the court held
that when the judgment of directors has been fairly exercised on
the basis of values as they then existed a purchase of a corpora
tion’s own stock can not subsequently be impeached because val
ues have later depreciated. In Barrett v. Webster Lumber Com
pany, 175 N. E. 765, the court went even further and said:
“ The contention of the plaintiff that a corporation can not purchase its own
stock except out of surplus profits can not be sustained.”

The purchase of treasury stock must not reduce the corporate
assets to an amount less than its debts and liabilities (Marvin v.
Anderson (1901) 111 Wis. 387) nor impair capital (Hamor v.
Taylor Rice Engineering Company (1897) 84 Fed. 392). A pur
chase by an insolvent corporation of its own shares either by cash
or a note should be voidable (In re Smith Lumber Company (1904)
132 Fed. 618; Buck v. Ross (1896) 68 Conn. 29). The reason is
that such a purchase is a fraud on prior creditors, because it is a
distribution of assets for which nothing of value to the creditors
is received in return, and it is a fraud on subsequent creditors
because they contracted on the faith of assets represented by the
capital stock. In Buck v. Ross, the court said:
“ If a corporation, by a purchase of shares of its own capital stock, thereby
reduces its actual assets below its capital stock and debts, or if the actual assets
at that time are less than the capital stock and debts, such purchase may be set
aside.”
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According to the facts of Matter of Fechheimer-Fishel Company
(1914) 212 Fed. 357, a solvent corporation bought its own stock
and gave a note for the purchase price. When the note matured
the corporation was insolvent. The court held that payment was
postponed to general creditors. This decision does not seem
reasonable. Since the purchase did not impair the capital at the
time it was made, a valid debt was created, for which the note
was simply a promise to pay (See 14 Columbia Law Review
451).
In Topken, Loring and Schwartz v. Schwartz (1928) 249 N. Y.
206, the court of appeals said:
“The capital of a corporation is held in trust for its creditors, so that any
agreement to purchase stock from a stockholder, which may result in the im
pairment of capital, will not be enforced, or will be considered illegal if the
rights of creditors are affected.”

According to the decision in Rasmussen v. Roberge (1927) 194
Wis. 362, a purchase of a company’s own stock is legal if it does
not bring outright insolvency. There is at least one contrary
decision. In In re Castle Braid Company (1906) 145 Fed. 224,
the court held that an insolvent company might with the consent
of all its stockholders purchase a majority of its shares, although
such purchases involved the use of its capital. This decision
is not in harmony with others on the point.
So far as creditors are concerned, the acquisition of treasury
stock by purchase when a corporation is insolvent has precisely
the same effect as the transfer of capital to the stockholders by the
payment of a dividend. This, we know, is illegal.
Rights of creditors are involved in any return of capital to stock
holders if the consideration given by them is simply a surrender of
their stock. In Booth v. Union Fibre Company (1919) 171 N. W.
307, a corporation promised to redeem its preferred stock at a
specified price at a specified date, but when that date arrived the
liabilities of the company exceeded its assets. The court held
that the holders of the preferred were not entitled to redemption
of their stock because the effect of redemption would be to imperil
the rights of creditors. According to the facts of Johnson v.
Canfield Swigart Company (1920) 292 Ill. 101, a corporation
paid assets to stockholders to such an extent that it became in
solvent. Existing creditors were paid by creating other creditors
in their place. The court decided that the stockholders must
refund.
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In Atlanta v. Smith (1909) 141 Wis.377, Justice Marshall gives
the following summary:
“ In other words, a purchase by a corporation of its own stock known by the
parties to the transaction, or which ought to be known by them, to render it
insolvent, is not a purchase in good faith as to existing creditors and not such to
future creditors if the parties to the transaction contemplate that the corpora
tion will continue to do business and incur indebtedness, as before, on the faith
of its previously supposed solvency continuing. In such a case the stock
holder surrendering his stock is to be regarded as having acted fraudulently,
at least constructively, as to existing creditors and subsequent creditors as well,
and held, as to the latter, estopped by his conduct from denying his continu
ance as a stockholder so far as such denial to effect would prejudice such credi
tors trusting the corporation upon the appearance of solvency, and such con
tinuance is necessary to liability to the corporation for the benefit of creditors
or to statutory liability to them.”

The courts do not permit a corporation to purchase its own
stock if creditors are injured thereby (Fremont Carriage Manu
facturing Company v. Thomsen (1902) 65 Neb. 370). In Com
mercial National Bank v. Burch, 141 Ill. 519, the court said:
“ Purchase of its own stock by a corporation by the exchange of its property
of equal value, though made in good faith and without any element of fraud
about it, there not being anything in the apparent condition of the company to
interfere with the making of the exchange, will not be allowed where it injuri
ously affects a creditor of the company, even though the fact of the indebted
ness was not at the time established or known to the stockholders.”

Judge Wilson made the following statement in Fraser v.
Ritchie (1881) 8 Ill. App. 554:
“The current of American authority . . . seems to be to the effect that
‘ under certain circumstances and for certain purposes, moneyed corporations
and corporations possessing banking powers, and in some instances other
corporations,' may invest their funds in the purchase of their own stocks, sub
ject to certain restrictions and limitations, one of which is that it shall not be
done at such time and in such manner as to take away the security upon which
the creditors of the corporation have the right to rely for the payment of their
claims, or, in other words, so as not to diminish the fund created for their
benefit.”

In Clapp v. Peterson (1882) 104 Ill. 26, this rule was applied to
existing creditors, while the court in Marvin v. Anderson (1901)
111 Wis. 387 refused relief to subsequent creditors. Several
decisions (First National Bank v. Salem (1889) 39 Fed. 89; Shoe
maker v. Washburn Lumber Company (1887) 97 Wis. 589) are to
the effect that assenting or subsequent creditors can not complain.
In the most recent decision that I have been able to find on the
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point, that of Campbell v. Grant Trust and Savings Company
(1932) 182 N. E. 267, the court held that subsequent creditors of a
corporation purchasing its own stock with corporate assets can
not be regarded as prejudicially affected thereby. Creditors
have no right to object when a corporation acquires treasury
stock by purchase so long as the capital, on which they are pre
sumed to rely, is kept intact (Joseph v. Raff (1903) 82 App. Div.
(N. Y.) 47).
When a corporation purchases its own stock, the transaction
must not cause loss to the minority stockholders. A stockholder,
who has not assented to such purchase, whose rights would be en
croached upon by it, is entitled to relief (Price v. Pine (1895) 41
S. W. 1020; Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Company (1895) 70 Fed.
646). According to a per-curiam opinion in Chicago v. Marseilles
(1877) 84 Ill. 643:
“ If it were shown that the purchase was made to promote the interests of the
officers of the company above, and not of the stockholders generally, or if for
the benefit of a portion of the stockholders and not all, or for the injury of all
or only a portion of them, . . . then chancery would interfere.”

In each case where the right of acquiring its own stock is in
volved the circumstances and purpose of the corporation must be
examined. The law requires good faith on the part of the com
pany. If the courts find a legitimate purpose back of the pur
chase, with no injury to creditors, they generally uphold the
transaction (Whitaker v. Grummond (1888) 68 Mich. 249). In
Knickerbocker Implement Company v. State Board of Assessors
(1907) 74 N. J. L. 583, the prosecuting corporation issued its
stock to an existing corporation under a contract to return seventy
five per cent of the shares for the creation of treasury stock which
was to be sold as fully paid and non-assessable for the purpose of
providing working capital for the new corporation. The court
held that treasury stock acquired in these circumstances was not
for a legitimate corporate purpose.
The directors or officers of the corporation usually have the
power to buy back the corporation’s stock in the jurisdictions
where such purchase is lawful (Phillips v. Riser (1911) 8 Ga. App.
634). According to a per-curiam opinion in Chicago v. Marseilles
(1877) 84 Ill. 643:
“ These authorities, we think, fully recognize the power of the directors of a
company, when not prohibited by their charter to purchase shares of stock of
their company.”
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In Thompson v. Shepherd (1932) 165 S. E. 796, it was held that
generally the directors, not the courts, should determine the
propriety of such a purchase. According to the facts of Federal
Mortgage Company v. Simes (1932) 245 N. W. 169, the directors
of a corporation sold their own stock in the company to it. In
that transfer they represented both the corporation and them
selves. Four out of the five directors owned the stock which was
sold, and it was necessary for the vending directors to act for the
corporation in order to constitute a quorum. Justice Owen held
that the contract was voidable by the corporation, whether the
company was injured or not. The price paid for the shares was
reasonable although it was below par.
At least one court has held that special authorization is neces
sary for the person buying the shares for the corporation. In
Calteaux v. Mueller (1899) 102 Wis. 525, part of the opinion reads
as follows:
“. . . a mere business manager of a corporate organization does not, by
virtue of his office, ordinarily possess any such extraordinary authority as that
of buying in its capital stock. . . . No court . . . goes so far as to hold that
the power can be exercised by an officer of the corporation having no special
authorization by the governing body so to do.”

In Thompson v. Shepherd (1932) 165 S. E. 796, the court de
cided that a purchase by a corporation of its stock from a director
is valid if free from fraud and made before bankruptcy when no.
one-existing corporate liabilities exist.
It was held in Wood v. McLean Drug Company (1933) 266 Ill.
App. 5, that directors of a corporation acting for the corporation
in the purchase of its stock occupy a trust relation in respect to
the stockholder from whom the stock is purchased and are under a
duty to disclose to such stockholder the facts affecting the value
of the stock.
In some circumstances the purchase of a corporation’s own
stock may be set aside. Should the company become insolvent
immediately after the purchase, creditors may treat the transfer
as a fraudulent conveyance (Corn v. Skillern (1905) 75 Ark. 148;
Buck v. Ross (1896) 68 Conn. 29; Hall v. Henderson (1899) 126
Ala. 499; Roan v. Winn (1887) 93 Mo. 503). The vendor stock
holder must know that the corporation is the buyer if the sale is
to be nullified. If the purchase frees from individual liability
a shareholder who would otherwise be personally liable to credi
tors, it would seem reasonable to permit creditors to set aside the
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transaction so far as the liability is concerned. A purchase of a
corporation’s own shares can not subsequently be impeached if
the corporate assets later depreciate in value (Williams v.
McLave (1915) 154 N. Y. Supp. 38).
The courts are more harsh with officers of a corporation than
with stockholders selling their shares to the company, but officers
will not necessarily be liable in tort for misappropriation of funds
where they have authorized a purchase of stock (Shoemaker v.
Washburn Lumber Company (1897) 97 Wis 585) nor are they indi
vidually liable to shareholders if the sale fails (Abeles v. Cochran
(1879) 22 Kan. 405). In First National Bank v. Heller Sawdust
Company (1927) 216 Mich. 464, a stockholder was held liable to a
creditor of a corporation for money paid to him for his shares
when the company had no surplus. It has been decided that
stockholders are not liable for the unpaid subscriptions on the
stock purchased by the corporation although they voted to au
thorize the purchase (Crawford v. Roney (1906) 126 Ga. 763;
Moon v. Waxahochie (1896) 13 Tex Civ. App. 103, affirmed (1896)
89 Tex. 511).
There are numerous decisions involving the enforceability of a
corporation’s contract to purchase its shares. In Gasser v. Great
Northern Insurance Company (1920) 220 S. W. 203, upon issuing
stock a corporation promised to refund the money paid for it un
less the concern changed its place of business. It failed to change.
The court held that if no rights of creditors were involved, stock
holders, upon tender of the stock, were entitled to recover the
money paid for it. A corporation under contract to buy back its
own shares need not do so if it is insolvent at the date set for the
transfer, because the effect would be to imperil creditors (Booth
v. Union Fibre Company (1919) 171 N. W. 307; Richards v.
Wiener (1912) 207 N. Y. 59; McIntyre v. Bement's Sons Company
(1906) 146 Mich. 74). In Topken, Loring and Schwartz v.
Schwartz (1928) 249 N. Y. 206, it was held that a promise by a
corporation to purchase its own shares from an employee is not
enforceable because there is no certainty that surplus funds will
exist when the date of performance arrives. The promise is not
good consideration because the act promised may be a crime, and
therefore it does not create a valid contract. In re FechheimerFishel Company (1914) 212 Fed. 357 is a decision in which the
court decided that where a solvent corporation agrees to pur
chase its own stock and gives a note in payment, the holder is
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postponed to general creditors, if at the time of payment, the
corporation has no surplus. A similar rule was followed in
Carter v. Boyden (1926) 13 Fed. (2d) 90; Keith v. Kilmer (1919)
261 Fed. 733, and Hoover v. Schaefer (1916) 90 N. J. Eq. 164. In
Wolff v. Heidritter Lumber Company (1932) 163 A. 140, ViceChancellor Buchanan made this statement in regard to Hoover
v. Schaefer:
“ The basic principle in the Hoover case is that the assets of a corporation are
primarily liable for the payment of its debts and that the stockholders can not
take the corporate assets to repay themselves the money they invested, if such
action leaves the corporation without sufficient assets to pay its creditors; . . .”

I have been able to find one contrary decision. In Davies v.
Montana Auto Finance Corporation (1930) 86 Mont. 500, a sub
scriber sued the defendant corporation on its promise to purchase
its shares. The corporation’s defense was that it was financially
unable to carry out the contract. Specific performance was
decreed on the ground that the corporation failed to show that any
creditor or stockholder would be injured by the purchase. In the
opinion the court said:
“ Where the reason for the rule fails . . . We see no reason why the plaintiffs
are not entitled to judgment, even if the corporation is insolvent.”

In other words, the fundamental reason for refusing to uphold or
enforce a corporation’s contract to buy its own stock is the pro
tection of creditors and the other stockholders of the company.
Where such protection is not involved the contract should be
enforced.
Corporations have been permitted to accept shares issued to a
purchaser with an option to return them if he so elect (Schulte v.
Boulevard (1913) 164 Cal. 464). In Kennerly v. Columbia Chemi
cal Corporation (1923) 137 Va. 240, the plaintiff invested $15,000 in
the defendant company’s stock upon the agreement of the com
pany to take back two-thirds of the stock at the plaintiff’s option.
It was held that the option was valid, and specific performance
was decreed on the part of the defendant company. The court
said that the weight of authority favors:
“. . . the validity of a contract of a corporation to repurchase its stock upon
sale to a purchaser.”

Insolvency, however, will release the corporation. In In re
Tichenor-Grand Company (1913) 203 Fed. 720, a corporation sold
stock to the plaintiff who became an employee with an option
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to leave at the end of three years and to sell the shares back to the
company at par. After the corporation became bankrupt the
plaintiff’s claim was dissolved by the court.
In Mulford v. Torrey Exploration Company (1909) 45 Colo. 81,
a contract under which a corporation was to buy back its own
shares at the option of the buyer was not called a purchase but a
failure of a conditional sale, or its rescission. This excellent
summary of the theory is found in 4 Fletcher’s Cyclopaedia of
Corporations (Perm. Ed.) sec. 1538:
“According to the weight of authority, an agreement by which a purchaser
may, at his option, at the end of a certain time, return the stock and receive
back the price, or whereby the company agrees to repurchase it at an agreed
price after a certain time, is in the nature of a conditional sale with an option
to the purchaser to rescind, and is valid, provided there is sufficient considera
tion which supports it and there is no fraudulent invasion of the rights of credi
tors or of the other stockholders. A reason sometimes given for sustaining
such agreements is that the contract is entire and indivisible, and that the
sale cannot be sustained unless the contract to repurchase can be enforced;
nor can the corporation be heard to say that the latter provision is ultra vires
without rescinding the sale and returning the purchase money.”

Promoters of a corporation have no authority to bind the cor
poration by a contract to repurchase stock subscribed for or sold
for the account of the corporation (Reiff v. Nebraska California
Colony, 277 Fed. 417; Drucklieb v. Harris, 209 N. Y. 211).
It has been held that treasury stock is not properly an asset of
the purchasing corporation. In Stevens v. Olus Company (1911)
130 N. Y. Supp. 22, a corporation with no surplus contracted to
purchase its own stock. It sought to enforce the agreement by
the argument that the treasury stock was an incoming asset which
could be sold to others and balanced the money paid for it. The
court held to the contrary. The court, in People v. Kelsey (1905)
93 N. Y. Supp. 369, decided that in the computation of a franchise
tax upon capital employed within the state, treasury stock was
not to be included as an asset. In Borg v. International Silver
Company (1925) 11 Fed. (2d) 147, Judge Hand made the following
statement in regard to treasury stock:
“ To carry the shares as a liability and as an asset at cost is certainly a fiction,
however admirable. They are not a liability, and on dissolution could not be
so treated, because the obligor and obligee are one. They are not a present
asset, because, as they stand, the defendant can not collect upon them. What
in fact they are is an opportunity to acquire new assets for the corporate
treasury by creating new obligations. In order to indicate this potentiality,
it may be the best accounting to carry them as an asset at cost, providing, of
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course, all other assets are so carried. Even so, a company which revalued its
assets might properly carry them at their sale value when the revaluation was
made. In any event there can be no ambiguity in stating the facts more
directly, as the defendant did, that is, in treating the shares as not in existence
while held in the treasury except as a possible source of assets at some future
time, when by sale at once they become liabilities and their proceeds assets. It
makes no difference whether this satisfies ideal accounting or not.”

There are two decisions to the effect that treasury stock is an
asset. In Taylor v. Miami Exportation Company (1833) 6 Ohio
83, it was held that where a corporation acquired its own shares
in payment of a debt such shares may be held and sold as other
property. The court, in Pabst v. Goodrich (1907) 113 N. W. 398,
said:
“A solvent corporation may purchase its own stock and keep it alive and
treat it as an asset.”

According to Ballantine in his Private Corporations (1927) 228,
treasury stock is: “. . . alive and dormant.”
There seems to be only one decision involving an attempt of a
creditor to obtain treasury stock as an asset (Coit v. Freed (1897)
15 Utah 426).
When a corporation pays money or gives other property for its
own shares it has parted with an asset. In return it has only the
possibility of getting something to take the place of the asset by
selling the shares. Until that time such shares are nothing, so
far as value is concerned. The immediate effect upon creditors
is the same as if the corporation had distributed a dividend equal
to the purchase price. Treasury stock is not an asset available
for the payment of debts. The corporation may sell the shares
for assets and it may not.
Although a corporation owns its treasury stock, reasons of
policy forbid it to exercise some of the natural incidents of owner
ship. It may not vote such shares (American Railway Frog
Company v. Haven (1869) 101 Mass. 398; McNeely v. Woodruff,
13 N. J. L. 352). According to 14 Corpus Juris 904:
“Corporations have, as hereafter seen, a qualified power to deal in their own
shares. . . . But stock thus owned or held by the corporation can not be voted
at corporate elections, and this rule applies with equal force to stock held by
trustees for the benefit of the corporation.”

The remaining stockholders have the sole voting privilege. A
majority of the rest of the shares is a majority for the purpose of
voting and for a quorum. In Market Street Railway v. Kellman
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(1895) 109 Cal. 571, it was held that a statute requiring the con
sent of three-fourths of the shareholders means the holders of
three-fourths of the outstanding shares.
So long as treasury stock is held by a corporation, such stock
can not participate in dividends (Vail v. Hamilton (1881) 85 N. Y.
453; O'Connor v. International Silver Company (1904) 68 N. J. Eq.
67). For financial purposes treasury stock has the same status as
if it had been retired. According to the court in Enright v. Heckscher (1917) 240 Fed. 863:
“ Indeed, the only difference between a share held in the treasury and one
retired is that the first may be resold for what it will fetch in the market, while
the second has disappeared altogether.”

Treasury stock may be redistributed among the shareholders
(Coleman v. Columbia Oil Company (1865) 51 Pa. 74) and such a
dividend may not be revoked (Dock v. Schlichter Jute Cordage
Company (1895) 167 Pa. 370). This is true although a statutory
prohibition of stock dividends exists (Commonwealth v. Boston
and Albany Railroad (1886) 142 Mass. 146).
A corporation may reissue its treasury stock (Ralston v. Bank of
California, 112 Cal. 208; 2 Cook on Corporations (8th edition,
1923) sec. 313). The reissue, however, must be properly author
ized (Dacovich v. Canizas (1907) 152 Ala. 287). A subsequent
sale is not subject to the same regulation as an original issue and
usually there is no liability on the part of the purchaser if he pays
less than par (City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce (1858) 17 N. Y.
507). Yet, in Barto v. Nix (1896) 15 Wash. 563, the court held
that a subsequent purchaser was liable for full value in spite of an
agreement to sell to him for less than par.
Existing stockholders have no right of preemption on a re
issue of treasury stock which has been treated as general assets
(Borg v. International Silver Company (1925) 11 Fed. (2d) 147;
Crosby v. Stratton (1902) 17 Colo. App. 212; Hartridge v. Rockwell
(1828) R. M. Charlt. (Ga.) 260; 14 Corpus Juris 396; 7 Ruling
Case Law 206). In Borg. v. International Silver Company, Judge
Hand said:
“ But treasury shares have by hypothesis once been issued, and have diluted,
as it were, the shareholder’s voting power ab initio. He can not properly com
plain that he is given no right to buy them when they are resold, because that
merely restores the status he originally accepted. All he can demand is that
they shall bring to the corporate treasury their existing value. If they do this,
his proportion in any surplus is not affected ...”
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In Bonnet v. First National Bank of Eagle Pass (1900) 60 S. W.
325, Justice Neill maintained that the right of preemption:
.
applies only when the capital is actually increased, and not to a
reissue of any portion of the original stock.”
Justice Thompson gives the following explanation in Crosby v.
Stratton:
“But because, to prevent impairment of their interest, corporators have a
preference in the purchase of unissued or new stock, it does not follow that they
have any right over strangers in the purchase of stock which has been paid for
and issued, but transferred back to the corporation as part of its general assets.
The right in the one case is founded on reasons which have no existence in the
other. The issued stock of a corporation represents its paid-up capital. The
holder owns it and disposes of it as he sees fit, and if it finds its way back into the
treasury, it becomes assets in the same sense that the corporation’s other prop
erty is assets. It is still part of the paid-up capital; and its sale no more affects
the value of the other stock, or the standing of the stockholders in the corpora
tion, than the sale of the company’s tools or machinery. The relative value of
all the stock is the same whether the particular stock of which we are speaking
remains in the hands of the original holders, or has been acquired from them
by the corporation and placed in its treasury. ... It is altogether immaterial
whether the stockholders sold the stock themselves or turned it over to the
company to be sold. In either case, they parted with all their interest in the
stock, and put its further disposition beyond their control. So far as our re
search has extended, the authorities are unanimous that where stock, once
issued, returns to the possession of the corporation, upon its reissue and sale the
right of purchase of stockholders and strangers is the same ...”

If treasury stock is cancelled, retired and later reissued, the
holders of the original stock are entitled to an opportunity to
purchase a proportional part of it. Justice Rosenberry made
the following statement in Dunn v. Acme and Garage Company
(1918) 168 Wis. 128:
"When the capital stock of the corporation has been decreased and it is pro
posed to reissue the repurchased stock, every reason for making such reissue
proportionate to the holdings of the then stockholders exists that would exist
if such increase were of stock not theretofore issued or an increase in the author
ized capital.”

The court admitted that a different question would have been
presented if the treasury stock had been carried on the books as
an asset.
Majority stockholders may not perpetuate their control by
issuing treasury shares to their friends (Thomas v. International
Silver Company (1907) 72 N. J. Eq. 224; Elliott v. Baker (1907)
194 Mass. 518).
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In Pabst v. Goodrich (1907) 153 Wis. 43, reissued treasury stock
was regarded as corpus of an estate.
The board of governors of the New York Stock exchange pro
hibits listed investment companies from purchasing their own
shares either directly or through subsidiaries. An allowance is
made for peculiar circumstances in which purchases are permitted
under surveillance of the governors. The London stock exchange
goes further and prohibits all listed corporations from buying their
own stock (Rules of the London Stock Exchange, March 23, 1921).
According to treasury department regulations 74, art. 66, nei
ther taxable profit nor deductible loss can arise from transactions
by a corporation in its own shares. This, however, does not
mean that a commercial profit or loss can not be realized or in
curred through dealing in treasury stock.
In The Journal of Accountancy for May I summarized the
statutes relative to treasury stock. In the present article I have
attempted to state the substance of the case law on the same sub
ject. The two articles taken together give a fairly complete
statement of the legal status of treasury stock at the present day.

